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The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty 
Nicole Huberfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fragmentation has aptly described the United States’ historically 
decentralized, disjointed, and disintegrated approach to health care.1 While 
fragmentation has endured in multiple dimensions—political, economic, 
organizational, relational, regulatory, and philosophical, to name a few—the 
exclusionary characteristic of American health care facilitated by fragmentation 
has been one of the greatest hurdles to access to needed care. Private health care 
providers have defended their prerogative to treat whomever, whenever, and the 
law largely has protected them from systemic integration2 in either care or finance 
that could facilitate more “unified decision making.”3 Moreover, the United States 
has lacked a unifying theory of access to health care, existing in an ordered chaos 
sustained by a century-long political rejection of collective response to the human 
* H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law and Bioethics Associate, University of Kentucky College 
of Law. Thanks to the participants in the Law of Medicare and Medicaid at 50 Symposium and to 
Jessica Roberts for helpful insights. Comments are welcome: nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu. Thanks 
always DT and SRHT. 
1. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) (essays 
examining the “fragmented” healthcare system and prescribing institutional changes to eliminate 
fragmentation). 
2. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care about Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix 
It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 1-6 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) (discussing 
various dimensions of fragmentation). Applying economic theory of “firms and team production,” 
Professor Elhauge discusses the deeply entrenched institutional problems of fragmentation:  
[H]ealth care raises the mother of all team production problems where input 
contributions are difficult to measure. . . . [I]n health care, shirking is likely to consist of 
failing to coordinate with others involved in the team effort on strategy, timing, and 
information-sharing in order to maximize health benefits per costs expended. . . . U.S. 
health care couples the mother of all team production problems with the mother of all 
refusals to use centralized ownership structures to solve them . . . .  
 Id. at 7. Both law and politics have protected health care providers from engaging in the 
integration commonly proposed during health care reform efforts that could facilitate a systemic 
approach. For example, Medicare’s enabling statute began with assurance to physicians that the 
federal government will not interfere in the practice of medicine. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
3. Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1 (defining fragmentation as “having multiple decision makers make 
a set of health care decisions that would be made better through unified decision making”). 
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need for care through unitary health reform.4  
The harmful effects of exclusion have been well studied and documented, but 
exclusion has remained an entrenched feature of American health care.5 As a result, 
individuals have always been excluded from health care based on various measures 
unrelated to their actual need for medical care, such as ability to pay, employment, 
parental status, or race.6 Even those covered by the nation’s medical safety net—
Medicaid—could only enroll if they were deemed “deserving” of governmental 
assistance. However, in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) created universal access to health insurance, facilitated through a federal 
takeover of health insurance law.7 The ACA shifted the law away from state-based 
private law to federally-based public law, shunned exclusion, and began to 
embrace a concept of health care as a public good, one that is inclusive and 
leveling. This shift started occurring incrementally through various federal laws 
over the years, but prior legislation rendered relatively small changes, and none 
universalized access to health care or health insurance until the ACA was enacted. 
In short, Congress legislated a new approach to health care through the ACA: 
universality.8  
The ACA’s statutory design of universal access to health insurance was a 
4. For a discussion of historic health care reform successes and failures leading to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, see PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION pt. I-II (2011) 
[hereinafter STARR, REMEDY]. 
5. Andew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults, 99 AM. J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH 2289, 2291-94 (2009) (finding that over 45,000 people die each year due to access issues 
resulting from uninsurance). See generally INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE 
TOO LATE (2002) (documenting how lack of insurance coverage creates barriers to access to health 
care that have measurably detrimental effects on health). 
6. Even Medicare, the politically popular social insurance program for the elderly, is rooted in 
the individual’s prior employment status. Americans must work in jobs that pay into the social 
security system for forty quarters to qualify for Medicare at age sixty-five, or they may pay premiums 
to access Medicare Part A (which typically does not require premiums). Because Medicare has 
permitted buy-in for people legally present in the United States, it is significantly less exclusionary 
than Medicaid; the point here is simply that work status has been a determinant of health care access 
in the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012). 
7. Not truly universal, as not every person within United States borders is eligible for health 
insurance. The largest excluded population is undocumented immigrants, who are excluded from 
Medicare, Medicaid, and exchanges through which insurance can be purchased. See, e.g., Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1323(f)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184 (2010) 
(excluding unlawful residents from access to insurance through exchanges). Medicaid covers 
emergency services that hospitals provide to undocumented immigrants, but they cannot enroll in 
Medicaid by receiving such services, unless the state in which the patient seeks care has opted to 
cover pregnant women and children who are undocumented. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2012). 
8. See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of 
the Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 1 (2014) [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, 
Great Society], http://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Huberfeld.pdf 
(analyzing universality as a civil right for Medicaid beneficiaries). 
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propitious step toward addressing the persistent exclusion facilitated by 
fragmentation in health care.9 For example, private health insurance markets and 
practices have been rendered more uniform and inclusive by the ACA. But, the 
most important changes arguably have been effectuated in Medicaid, because it is 
no longer limited to certain categories of qualifying people or illnesses. The law of 
Medicaid is now inclusive rather than exclusive, because the ACA as written 
rendered all people earning up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) eligible 
to enroll. This relatively simple statutory modification was a metamorphosis for 
the program that enrolled only the “deserving poor” for its first forty-nine years.10  
This essay explores how the law of Medicaid at fifty creates a meaningful 
principle of universalism by shifting from fragmentation and exclusivity to 
universality and inclusivity. The universality principle provides a new trajectory 
for all of American health care, one that is not based on individual qualities that 
are unrelated to medical care but rather grounded in non-judgmental principles of 
unification and equalization (if not outright solidarity). To that end, this Essay first 
will study the legislative reformation that led to universality and its quantifiable 
effects. The Essay then will assess and evaluate Medicaid’s new universality 
across four dimensions, namely governance, administration, equity, and eligibility. 
Each reveals a facet of universality that underscores this new principle’s 
importance for health care into the future.  
I. FROM FRAGMENTATION TO UNIVERSALITY 
The United States has sustained a fragmented health care system that has 
excluded many people from both health insurance and health care. When other 
countries adopted social insurance or socialized medicine under the philosophy of 
solidarity after World War II, Americans rejected it, instead opting to continue the 
employer-provided private insurance apparatus encouraged by federal tax 
9. The ACA built on the existing structure of hybrid public/private insurance to achieve 
universal coverage. The majority of Americans will access insurance through their employers, by 
virtue of a penalty placed on large employers who do not offer affordable health insurance benefits, 
or through purchasing private insurance on health insurance exchanges with premium assistance for 
people earning 100% to 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The elderly and permanently 
disabled are still covered by Medicare. The poor are covered by Medicaid; and, as this essay 
discusses, Medicaid will cover all of the poor earning up to 138% of the FPL for the first time in 
Medicaid’s history. Thus, the ACA maintains fragmented insurance coverage through large, small, 
and individual markets as well as through private and public plans, but it also unifies insurance 
customs through federal rules that make all Americans insurable and that prohibit insurance practices 
that made some people uninsurable through, for example, preexisting condition exclusions and other 
discriminatory practices. For a deeper explanation of the ACA’s architecture, see STARR, REMEDY, 
supra note 4, at 239-46. 
10. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444-53 (2011). 
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benefits.11 The employment-based private health insurance design excluded a large 
proportion of Americans, namely those who were elderly, poor, or otherwise 
outside worker-focused health insurance mechanisms. Historically, the elderly and 
poor were assisted by state-based medical welfare programs, but by the 1950’s, 
states could not cover everyone who could not afford health care for lack of 
insurance. It was no secret that the elderly and the poor were bankrupted by their 
encounters with medicine, and state safety nets often failed for lack of funds, 
political support, and budgetary shortfalls.  
 When Congress enacted Medicaid, it aided some of those individuals who 
were excluded from health insurance by virtue of their poverty, but Medicaid’s 
coverage was far from universal. Medicaid was a program for those outside of the 
private care, private insurance realm, and despite being part of the Great Society’s 
push for legislative civil rights, Medicaid eligibility depended on the dual 
characteristics of being both poor and within states’ historic, welfare-related 
definition of “deserving.”12 For the first forty-nine years of its existence, Medicaid 
never covered more than half of the poor because the program only protected low 
income Americans who were also pregnant women, children, blind, disabled, 
elderly, or deemed medically indigent.13 Due to the ACA, however, Medicaid has 
become available to anyone who financially qualifies,14 which had been proposed 
but was never passed.15 This Part documents the move from fragmentation to 
universality, grounding its analysis in the universal coverage Medicaid now 
provides. 
A. Medicaid’s Statutory Transformation 
Medicaid was created at the same time as Medicare, but the political capital 
was invested in creating social insurance for the elderly, who successfully lobbied 
for a national, universal health insurance program in Medicare.16 The safety net for 
11. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 235-89 (1982) 
[hereinafter STARR, TRANSFORMATION]. 
12. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 46-47 (1974). 
13. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently Unstable, 
38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 332 (2012) (discussing Medicaid’s coverage limitations). 
14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a), 124 Stat. 119, 
271-75 (2010). The companion legislation, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
(HCERA) of 2010, added a 5% income disregard, effectively raising new Medicaid eligibility to 
138% of the FPL. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, § 1004(e), 124 Stat. 1029, 1036. 
15. STARR, REMEDY, supra note 4, at 105, 175 (describing prior plans to expand Medicaid to 
deal with the uniquely American problem of the uninsured). 
16. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 12, at 53. 
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the remainder of the poor was an afterthought.17 By many accounts, no one 
expected Medicaid to last very long in its dual governmental, exclusionary 
structure.18 Medicaid was a continuation of the Kerr-Mills program, which 
provided federal funding to the states to continue their medical assistance to the 
poor.19 The Medicaid Act created a stronger federal framework, and Congress 
intended to ensure that states provided minimal economic security to the needy 
who qualified. But, even with strengthened federal rules, many decisions were left 
in the hands of the states, continuing fragmentation through patient exclusion and 
disunified administration that existed in health care long before Medicaid was 
enacted.20  
While Medicaid offered generous federal funding to states and created a 
federal regulatory superstructure that states had to accept to receive funding, 
decisions about eligibility and provision of medical care echoed states’ preexisting 
medical welfare programs. This meant that the stigmatizing concept of the 
“deserving poor” was carried forward into Medicaid, so only a limited portion of 
the poor would be eligible to enroll.21 Also, limiting Medicaid to the deserving 
poor meant that “able bodied” adults were not eligible unless a state opted to spend 
its own funds on them, with no federal match. Medicaid’s safety net clearly was 
not intended to catch everyone. Further, due to categorization of the poor to qualify 
for Medicaid, beneficiaries were marked as poor and either deserving or 
undeserving, isolating them from the rest of the population who received health 
coverage through private mechanisms.22 Even though Medicaid was supposed to 
funnel the neediest into mainstream medicine, in many ways it sustained fractured 
medical care by virtue of its welfare-related stigma and such signifiers of lower 
status as the minimal reimbursement rates states paid to participating providers.23 
17. See generally Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 444 (detailing Medicaid’s path dependence). 
18. Rosemary Stevens & Robert Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 348, 420 (1970) (predicting that Medicaid would be quickly “phased out”). 
19. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 12, at 51. 
20. Before Medicaid, states provided medical welfare to indigent patients who fit within the 
deserving poor categories. The states could not afford to provide medical welfare when the Great 
Depression hit, and from the passage of the first Social Security Act through 1965, the federal 
government provided more money and more rules to the states to support medical welfare programs. 
Each state had its own rules regarding medical welfare, though the provision of benefits to only the 
deserving poor was remarkably consistent. See Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 436-44 (discussing 
medical welfare programs that predated Medicaid). 
21. Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 439-40 (illuminating the deserving poor standard). 
22. DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY 29-30, 39 (2010). 
23. Id. at 47. Before Medicaid, the uninsured had few choices for health care. Many availed 
themselves of the care available in emergency departments under Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act’s (EMTALA) strictures. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (requiring all hospitals that accept 
Medicare and that have emergency departments to treat anyone who presents with an emergency 
condition). Because many hospitals were nonprofit and tax-exempt, some indigent uninsured 
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Those who could qualify for Medicaid found that they were treated as “others,” 
and those who were not eligible often were not treated at all. 
 Over time, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility24 by requiring states to 
provide comprehensive medical coverage to children under age twenty-one;25 to 
expand coverage of the aged, blind, and disabled;26 to expand eligibility standards 
for pregnant women and for children;27 and to financially support drug coverage 
for people enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid after the Medicare drug benefit 
was enacted.28 Due to many small expansions through the years, Medicaid now 
financed the most health care of any payor, public or private, in the health care 
sector.29 Even so, Medicaid excluded childless, non-elderly, non-disabled adults 
from its funding for most of its existence.  
In 2010, Congress enacted another eligibility increase through the ACA, 
which required states to count as eligible everyone under age sixty-five earning up 
to 133% of the FPL. Thus, the ACA abandoned long-standing exclusion of non-
elderly childless adults by making any low-income citizen (or legal resident) 
eligible to enroll in Medicaid. The ACA eliminated Medicaid’s qualifying 
categories for purposes of eligibility (though not for other administrative 
purposes),30 rejecting old judgments regarding who is “deserving” of medical 
received charity care that was absorbed by hospitals or written off as bad debt by hospitals. See 
generally Lisa Kinney Helvin, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-For-Profit Hospitals Doing Their 
Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421 (2008) (discussing failure of nonprofit hospitals 
to provide adequate charity care and the result of such failures). But, many uninsured Americans who 
would not have been classified as indigent attempted to pay their medical debts and filed for 
bankruptcy in so doing because hospitals charged full, non-negotiated prices to private pay patients. 
See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates 
over Healthcare Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001) 
(presenting the third part of an empirical study showing that medical costs were the primary source 
of individual bankruptcy). 
24. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing Medicaid expansions). 
25. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §§ 301-02, 81 Stat. 821, 921-
29 (1967) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
26. Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 
1370-74, 1465-78 (1972) (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
27. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 302, 102 Stat. 683, 
750-51 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(l) (2012)). 
28. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
29. Medicaid Moving Forward, KAISER FAM. FOUND., (2014) [hereinafter Medicaid Moving 
Forward], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/7235-07-medicaid-moving-
forward2.pdf. 
30. Under the Social Security Amendments of 1965, the different categories of qualifying poor 
have varying qualifying levels of earnings as well as options states can exercise to cover more 
categorically poor at higher earning levels; for example, the median coverage level for pregnant 
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assistance and starting movement toward the policy of inclusion that is 
universality. The post-ACA Medicaid shed its Elizabethan trappings,31 inviting all 
comers to find security in its coverage. 
In NFIB v. Sebelius,32 the Supreme Court effectively rendered the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion optional for states, but, paradoxically, neither the ACA’s nor 
Medicaid’s statutory language was struck down or modified. The Court’s unusual 
administrative remedy for its conclusion that the expansion was unconstitutionally 
coercive slowed the process of Medicaid expansion, because the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services could not penalize states that choose 
not to expand eligibility. But, the law of the Medicaid expansion that created the 
principle of universality was untouched. Whether states immediately expand 
Medicaid to the newly eligible or not,33 universality is a statutory policy change 
that will have multiple, potentially long-lasting effects.  
One obvious and immediate effect is the increase in coverage that is the 
inevitable result of expanding eligibility, regardless of state choice to opt in or out 
of expansion. Medicaid was already a key program for certain populations, but the 
expansion will have the effect of spreading Medicaid patients across the health 
care sector. Because they are no longer labeled worthy or unworthy of medical 
assistance, Medicaid patients will not be limited to the obstetrics unit, long term 
care, or pediatricians’ offices. The infiltration of Medicaid patients throughout the 
health care sector will facilitate integration for the Medicaid population. The next 
subsection studies the numbers behind Medicaid’s universality for both 
historically covered populations and the newly eligible to understand the 
implications of eligibility expansion in the context of universality. 
B. Universality in Medicaid by the Numbers 
A significant proportion of Americans will enroll in Medicaid to access 
medically necessary health care at some point in any given year—as many as one 
in four when the Medicaid expansion is completed. But, even before 2014, 
Medicaid covered approximately 20% of Americans, and for pregnant women, 
children, and the elderly, Medicaid was already ubiquitous.34 As of 2010, Medicaid 
women is 185% FPL, which combines the 133% FPL mandatory coverage level with state options 
to cover women at higher levels of income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012). 
31. See Huberfeld, supra note 10, at 439.  
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
33. For a study of the federalism dimensions of Medicaid expansion, see Tom Baker, Abbe R. 
Gluck, Nicole Huberfeld & Theodore Ruger, The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and 
Theoretical Assessment of How Federalism Has Changed in Health Care and Beyond (forthcoming 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511003. 
34. See Medicaid: A Primer: Key Information on the Nation’s Health Coverage Program for 
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covered 48% of all births in the United States35 and nearly two-thirds of all 
unintended pregnancies.36 Non-pregnant and childless women have not qualified 
for Medicaid and many have been uninsured. With the Medicaid expansion, 
approximately 4.6 million women of reproductive age will become eligible for 
Medicaid, which will increase the percentage of births covered by Medicaid as 
well.37 Medicaid also has covered more than half of all complex deliveries, though 
that number may decrease after expansion because women are likely to become 
healthier due to the preventive care they will receive as part of the newly eligible 
population.38 
As of 2013, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
which are separately funded but often have unified operations, provided health care 
coverage to more than 37% of all children under eighteen.39 Public coverage of 
children has been extensive and especially concentrated among the approximately 
20% of children who live in families earning less than 100% of the FPL.40 For 
example, 73% of children in families earning less than 100% of the FPL are 
covered by Medicaid/CHIP,41 and 45% of children in families earning between 
Low-Income People, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 8, (2013) [hereinafter Medicaid: A Primer], 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334-05.pdf. 
35. Anne Rosier Markus et al., Medicaid Covered Births, 2008 Through 2010, in the Context of 
the Implementation of Health Reform, WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES, Sept.-Oct. 2013, at e273–e280, 
http://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(13)00055-8/pdf. This rate is high in part because 
states have historically increased income eligibility levels for pregnant women and in part because 
poor women have less access to birth control and higher rates of unintended pregnancies. See id. at 
e274; Medicaid: A Primer, supra note 34, at 9.  
36. Adam Sonfield et al., The Public Costs of Births Resulting from Unintended Pregnancies: 
National and State-Level Estimates, 43 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 94 (2011). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga & Rachel Arguello, Children’s Health Coverage: 
Medicaid, CHIP and the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/8570-children_s-health-coverage-
medicaid-chip-and-the-aca1.pdf. 
40. Carmen DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 
2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 14 (2014), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf. 
Children are proportionally overrepresented in the low-income population: “Children represented 
23.5 percent of the total population and 32.3 percent of people in poverty.” Id.  
41. Children who are eligible may not be enrolled if their parents are not also eligible; this is a 
different aspect of the welcome mat effect that the ACA would have because newly covered parents 
would have the knowledge and incentive to enroll both themselves and their already eligible children 
in Medicaid. See, e.g., Genevieve M. Kenney et al., A First Look at Children’s Health Insurance 
Coverage under the ACA in 2014, URBAN INST. 2 (2014), http://hrms.urban.org/briefs/Childrens-
Health-Insurance-Coverage-under-the-ACA-in-2014.pdf; see also Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica 
Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as Social Insurance, 46 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 
[hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical Perspective] (forthcoming 2015), 
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100-250% of FPL are enrolled, but only 16% of children in households earning 
between 250-399% of FPL are Medicaid enrollees.42 Medicaid will now cover 
more children aged five to eighteen, whom prior to the ACA were only covered up 
to 100% of the FPL. Estimates are that about 600,000 children enrolled due to the 
ACA in 2014,43 and predictions indicate that millions more will be covered when 
hold out states opt in to Medicaid expansion given the concentration of uninsured 
children in the South.44 
Many people over age sixty-five will require institutional long-term care,45 
which Medicare reimburses only when skilled nursing is required; consequently, 
Medicaid has been funding at least 40% of all long-term care costs in the United 
States.46 That means Medicaid finances care for more than 60% of long-term 
nursing home residents, despite their Medicare coverage47; in some states, that 
number is higher.48 Neither the ACA nor Medicaid expansion will change this 
coverage much, given that expansion is concentrated in people under sixty-five. 
Non-elderly people who become disabled are eligible for Medicaid, and they have 
been included in Medicaid’s long-term care coverage for decades. While the ACA 
facilitated experimentation with community-based long-term care rather than 
institutionalized care, long-term care coverage was not radically reformed by the 
ACA.49 As such, it contributes to Medicaid’s universality going forward because 
it was already so important for the elderly and disabled populations. 
Covering only the “deserving poor,” Medicaid provided health care coverage 
to more than one in five Americans before the ACA,50 and the Congressional 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532495. 
42. RUDOWITZ et al., supra note 39. 
43. Recent Trends in Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment: Analysis of CMS Performance Measure 
Data through August 2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 4 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/recent-
trends-in-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-analysis-of-cms-performance-measure-data-issue-brief. 
44. See, e.g., Joan Alker et al., Uninsured Children 2009-2011: Charting the Nation’s Progress, 
GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 4-5 (2012), 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Uninsured-Children-2009-2011.pdf. 
45. DONALD REDFOOT & WENDY FOX-GRAGE, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., MEDICAID: A PROGRAM 
OF LAST RESORT FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 1 (2013) (stating that 
seven out of ten people turning sixty-five will need long-term care at some point in their lives). 
46. Medicaid: A Primer, supra note 34, at 4. 
47. Id. 
48. See 155 CONG. REC. E2468, E2469-70 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009) (statement of Rep. Mike 
Rogers attaching letter by Gov. Charlie Crist, dated September 17, 2009) (describing Medicaid as 
financing long term care for both seniors and disabled people). 
49. Community-Based and Long-Term Services and Supports, MEDICAID.GOV, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/affordablecareact/provisions/community-based-long-term-services-and-
supports.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
50. For deeper discussion of the demographics of Medicaid’s enrollment, see Huberfeld & 
Roberts, Great Society, supra note 8; Huberfeld & Roberts, Empirical Perspective, supra note 41. 
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Budget Office estimates the number of new Medicaid enrollees at more than 
eighteen million by 2018 and another two million by 2024, which will increase 
Medicaid’s enrollment to one in four Americans.51 In addition to covering over 
half of all pregnancies, more than a third of all children, and well over half of all 
long-term nursing home residents, previously excluded low-income parents and 
childless adults who cannot obtain health insurance through employers will now 
be included in Medicaid’s medical assistance.  
Of the newly eligible adults, most are either the working poor or employees 
of small businesses, as uninsured adults generally fall into two categories: workers 
who are self-employed or work for small companies that cannot offer insurance 
benefits, or those in low wage jobs that do not offer insurance or that do not offer 
affordable insurance. Among newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries, 79% have at 
least one worker in the family, with 63% in full time employment and 16% in part 
time employment.52 Many of the newly eligible are workers who want health 
insurance but are not offered it or cannot afford it, and Medicaid now acts as the 
employment benefit of health insurance that wealthier workers have enjoyed since 
the 1940s. 
In short, Medicaid covers more lives than any other health insurance 
mechanism in the United States, and it has surpassed Medicare in enrollment and 
total spending.53 The statutory philosophy behind that increase was a federal policy 
choice to include all Americans in health insurance coverage so that they are no 
longer excluded based on individual characteristics or subject to the physical and 
economic insecurity of inconsistent health care access.54 The universality 
encompassed by this policy choice is broader in some respects than social 
insurance because it is not grounded in work status (in contrast to Medicare, large 
group, and small group insurance). Medicaid is now a de facto form of social 
insurance in our health care system given that it is covering a substantial portion 
of the working poor. But, it also covers those who cannot work, cannot find work, 
or are unable to work, and it provides more thorough grounding in access to health 
51. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, CONG. BUDGET OFF 58 (2014), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf (“By 
2024, about 89 million people will be enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.”). 
52. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2, 4, (2013), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/8488-key-facts-about-the-uninsured-
population.pdf. 
53. Medicaid Moving Forward, supra note 29, at 1. 
54. President Barack Obama, On Behalf of My Mother, Remarks at the Signing of Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/23/behalf-my-mother (“And we have now just enshrined, 
as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some basic security when it 
comes to their health care.”). 
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care than insurance coverage that is linked to worker status. It is less fragmentary 
and more equalizing than employment-based insurance, which makes it an 
important source of economic and social stabilization for low income workers. The 
principle of universality has bypassed the resistance to solidarity that stymied 
health care reform for many years, and instead of being “phased out,” Medicaid 
has embodied this new legislative principle.55 
II. UNIVERSALITY IN FOUR DIMENSIONS 
Medicaid’s expansion to capture individuals who historically have fallen into 
gaps enlarged by fragmentation demonstrates a move from exclusivity to 
inclusivity in the American health care system. Yet, non-exclusion contains 
important ramifications beyond enrollment. This part explores four dimensions of 
universality—governance, administration, equity, and eligibility—that provide 
useful lenses through which to consider the multi-layered implications of 
universality.  
A. Universality in Governance 
Medicaid has long been considered a classic cooperative federalism 
program.56 To the Supreme Court, this has meant that the federal government can 
drive policy with large sums of money, but it cannot force states to partner in 
Medicaid.57 To the federal government, this has meant that Congress occasionally 
drives health care policy forward by expanding Medicaid eligibility or medical 
coverage, and then HHS negotiates with the states to enforce the reform. To the 
states, this has meant large transfers of federal funding that help to balance state 
budgets by covering indigent patients while states engage in diverging and largely 
uncontested interpretations of the Medicaid Act.  
In addition to these inter-governmental dynamic negotiations, Medicaid has 
been partially privatized by waiver. The ACA ushered in negotiations with HHS 
to expand eligibility, rendered more aggressive on states’ part by the holding in 
NFIB v. Sebelius. Each of the expansion-related waiver requests thus far contains 
a privatization element, whether by placing newly eligible enrollees in qualified 
health plans in the exchanges, or by funneling the newly eligible into Medicaid 
55. See Stevens & Stevens, supra note 18, at 420. 
56. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980). 
57. See, e.g.,Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-07 (Roberts, C.J., holding the Medicaid expansion as 
written in the ACA unconstitutionally coercive because the states could not choose whether to expand 
their categories of eligibility without losing all of their Medicaid funding). 
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managed care plans, or by seeking a health savings account format for them.58 
Medicaid has been a hybrid program, weaving together federal and state policy 
and administration, public and private systems, and the deserving poor with others 
in the health care system. HHS’s authority to grant section 1115 waivers, which 
provide states with flexibility in Medicaid and other programs governed by the 
Social Security Act to create demonstration programs, always has included the 
ability to authorize privatization, but the federal/state, public/private hybrid has not 
been subject to the universality backstop until now. The multifaceted policy 
implementation in Medicaid could be deemed an example of new governance,59 or 
it could be viewed as a facet of heath care fragmentation. 
Over time, federal rules have increased in the Medicaid program, and the 
states often have pushed back against greater federal superstructure.60 While this 
dynamic is a gripping study in modern federalism, experimentation often occurs 
for budgetary reasons and not for the benefit of Medicaid enrollees. States need 
federal funding to provide medical assistance, but they often reject or attempt to 
bypass the federal rules that come with copious funding for political reasons. 
Medicaid is the largest transfer of wealth from the federal government to the states 
in American history. But, the states remain part of Medicaid’s administration for 
path dependent reasons—they have always been involved in welfare medicine, and 
so they remain involved in welfare medicine. This bifurcated governance is 
inefficient both administratively and economically and is exacerbated by states’ 
slow path to expansion, which prolongs exclusionary policy in opt-out states. 
HHS has been expending tremendous effort negotiating with states in the 
wake of NFIB v. Sebelius to convince them that they should expand Medicaid 
eligibility and to consider their various proposals for demonstration waivers.61 If 
the program were fully federalized, as I have discussed elsewhere,62 expansion 
would be complete by now. HHS administrators could instead spend time on 
administering the program rather than negotiating with reticent, self-serving states 
58. See Baker et al., supra note 33. 
59. See THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 15 (Lester M. 
Salomon ed., 2002) (offering a way station between “command and control” governance and pure 
privatization through a negotiated management format).  
60. For example, the National Governors Association has a standing policy statement regarding 
health care that demands both “proper[]” federal funding and safeguarded state “flexibility.” National 
Governors Association, NGA Policy Position HHS-05 Health (2013), 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-policy-positions/page-hhs-policies/col2-
content/main-content-list/health.html (adopted at NGA’s Winter 2013 meeting). 
61. See, e.g., Nathaniel Weixel, Burwell Urges Hesitant Governors to Work with HHS on 
Medicaid Expansion, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Nov. 4, 2014 (reporting on 
Secretary Burwell’s remarks to the fall meeting of the National Association of Medicaid Directors 
that invited any state interested in Medicaid expansion to talk with her). 
62. See generally Huberfeld, supra note 10. 
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who hold out for political purposes. Allowing states to maintain a co-governance 
role in Medicaid is not supported by finance or by medical standards.63 
Universality provides a developing legislative structure that informs HHS’s 
management of Medicaid in its negotiations with states, and it can provide a new 
direction for Medicaid’s governance by clarifying the national government’s role 
in public health insurance, which is already substantial. The ongoing reliance on 
states in health care governance should be reconsidered in light of the principle of 
universality. While some states have accepted the new federal law of Medicaid as 
their guide for Medicaid enrollment, the continued role of states creates a tension 
with the goals of health care reform by slowing Medicaid expansion for political 
purposes. Governance viewed through the lens of universality supplies another 
reason that the experiment of the states is no longer appropriate in Medicaid. 
 
B. Universality in Administration 
The principle of universality provides a new path for battling administrative 
fragmentation in health care. Health care in the United States has been 
decentralized in decision-making, delivery, finance, information sharing, and other 
ways. Medicaid has been a particularly exaggerated form of fragmented 
administration, because each state creates its own structure for complying with the 
federal Medicaid Act. Although the Medicaid Act has provided a baseline for states 
regarding standards for medical welfare, the program has allowed huge amounts 
of state variation within the federal rules so long as states have not provided less 
(on paper) than the federal statute requires.64 
While some aspects of Medicaid historically have been unwaivable—such as 
eligibility and enrollment for people who meet the terms of the Medicaid Act, 
statewide benefit consistency, and freedom of choice among health care providers 
participating in Medicaid—states have been able to designate for HHS how they 
will comply with the many aspects of the Medicaid program with little pushback 
so long as the state’s plan was budget neutral.65 States have often divided different 
categorically eligible enrollees into more or less deserving categories. For 
example, every state has chosen to increase the income level at which pregnant 
women will be covered. But, only some states have provided benefits to parents of 
63. See id. at 743-49. 
64. See generally John Holahan, Variation in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical 
Expenditures: How Much Is Too Much?, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY (John Holahan, Alan 
Weil & Joshua M. Wiener, eds. 2003). 
65. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Section 1115 Waivers, MEDICAID.GOV, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/section-
1115-demonstrations.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
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eligible children above the level dictated by the Medicaid Act.66 These options and 
inconsistencies make for overly complex administration at both federal and state 
levels, as well as inequitable medical coverage for enrollees (discussed further 
below).  
HHS cannot manage each state at a granular level.67 Only when it is quite clear 
that a state is running afoul of the Medicaid Act does HHS confront a state 
regarding compliance. Further, HHS never pulls state funding, because its policy 
goals are different from a state’s—HHS wants to ensure that bodies are in the 
program, getting covered for as much health care as possible, while states 
habitually are using federal funding to balance their budgets.68 Each state makes 
some individualized decisions regarding the medical coverage of its Medicaid 
population, the payment rates for health care providers who participate in the 
Medicaid program, and the way that the state will contract with managed care 
entities that will cover the state population. These decisions, to which HHS 
generally defers, have created a fifty state patchwork of Medicaid benefits, 
eligibility, and rules that renders the Medicaid program quite fragmented, 
especially if an enrollee ever changes residency.  
This highly decentralized approach to Medicaid makes health care for low-
income citizens administratively inefficient.69 This aspect of fragmentation creates 
wildly varying standards of health care access and care that impact patient care. 
For example, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recently issued an 
evaluation entitled State Standards for Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care, 
in which the OIG appraised each state’s Medicaid managed care contracting and 
found state oversight of quality control and access to care lacking.70 Not only did 
many states fail to set standards for access to care, but also the OIG stressed that 
HHS must “strengthen oversight” of the program to ensure protection of enrollees 
66. Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits for Adults at Application, as of August 28, 2014, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND.(2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-income-eligibility-limits-for-
adults-at-application-2014 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
67. See generally Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012), (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-
283), 2011 WL 3706105. 
68. See, e.g., Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, STATES’ USE OF MEDICAID 
MAXIMIZATION STRATEGIES TO TAP FEDERAL REVENUES: PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES, URBAN INST. (2002), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310525_DP0209.pdf. 
69. See Randall R. Bovberg et al., State and Federal Roles in Health Care: Rationales for 
Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 25, 44 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & 
Joshua Wiener, eds. 2003); Marilyn Moon, Making Medicaid a National Program: Medicare as a 
Model, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 325, 330 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua Wiener eds., 
2003). 
70. Suzanne Murrin, State Standards for Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care, DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-11-00320.pdf. 
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when state administration fails.71 
The theory of universality can simplify Medicaid’s administrative morass. 
Although HHS has conciliated states in the interest of policy entrenchment and 
increased health care access through maximizing the lives covered, HHS now must 
exercise greater control in the administrative choices and procedures in Medicaid. 
HHS is responsible for directing and monitoring states’ compliance with 
universalism. Though NFIB v. Sebelius limited HHS’s authority to enforce state 
participation in Medicaid’s expansion, once a state does signal interest in eligibility 
expansion, HHS has a stronger hand to play. State proposals that could diminish 
the inclusivity of Medicaid expansion should not be entertained, and HHS could 
do much to centralize the multitudinous state decisions to ensure the basic care for 
Medicaid beneficiaries is not full of gaps. 
 While universality does not speak directly to these internal administrative 
issues, and the NFIB spin on universality has complicated Medicaid administration 
temporarily because of the subsequent executive branch invitation to negotiate 
through waiver proposals, ultimately, universality will furnish a backstop to state 
requests for flexibility through welfare-like “experiments” with requirements that 
are unrelated to health care. Proposals such as work-search requirements are not 
only outdated in light of the principle of universality, but they also increase the 
need for administrative oversight and further diversify it by virtue of the tailoring 
required of such requests. Other requirements, such as wellness programs or co-
payments enforceable for portions of the newly eligible population, also can 
increase administrative complications due to increased diversification of state 
Medicaid programs, which are harder for the limited HHS staff to manage.72  
 HHS must enable enrollment in Medicaid in order to entrench the new federal 
policy of universality, but it cannot do so at the expense of enrollees’ health status, 
which is jeopardized when states take a laissez faire approach to Medicaid 
administration. Now that universality has detached Medicaid from old 
stigmatizing, disequalizing, welfare-like conditions, the states should not be 
permitted to negotiate new welfare conditions into the expansion, which only 
complicate administration of the program. While the negotiations between HHS 
and the states display a blazingly dynamic federalism, which is both vertical and 
horizontal, that federalism is not necessarily of value to enrollees, especially 
without assurance that HHS will provide real oversight as states negotiate, respond, 
and react.73 
71. Id. at 17-20 (instructing the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a sub-agency of 
HHS, to increase oversight of state managed care programs). 
72. See generally Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2013), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8416.pdf. 
73. See Baker et al., supra note 33. 
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C. Universality in Equity 
Upon enactment in 1965, one clear goal for Medicaid was to mainstream 
eligible beneficiaries into the medical care available to everyone else. Over the 
past fifty years, America’s fragmented health care system has facilitated continued 
segregation for people of means in private insurance and people who are low 
income, whether uninsured or in Medicaid.74 It is widely understood that the 
uninsured do not have consistent access to health care and that they delay care or 
do not receive needed care due to cost.75 Thus, the greatest health care inequity 
currently exists for low income populations in states that have not yet expanded 
their Medicaid eligibility standards. Until those states expand, Medicaid’s 
inclusivity is thwarted, and people will not receive medically necessary care due 
to lack of insurance coverage. The holdout states correlate strongly to the states 
that have high Medicaid federal matching rates and high levels of uninsurance, 
raising questions about the political theater being staged in the opt out states. 
Yet, once enrolled in Medicaid, enrollees still can experience difficulty 
finding health care providers who will accept them as new patients.76 This inequity 
in access and care could increase instability as expansion progresses over the next 
several years. Some doctors are unable or unwilling to treat Medicaid patients, and 
Medicaid beneficiaries sometimes face obstacles in finding basic preventive 
services.77 While this may result in part from Medicaid patients residing in 
medically underserved areas, Medicaid patients in health care rich environments 
reportedly experience some under-service as well.78 
The ACA attempted to address inequitable access by increasing Medicaid’s 
primary care physician payments to Medicare levels for 2013 and 2014, and some 
evidence indicates that the increased payments drew physicians into Medicaid who 
74. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003). 
75. See, e.g., Health Insurance and Access to Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/factsheet_hiac.pdf; COMM. ON HEALTH INSURANCE 
& ITS CONSEQUENCES, INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH 
AND HEALTH CARE (2009). 
76. The Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) report on state oversight of managed care for 
Medicaid populations discussed this problem to a degree. See STATE STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO 
CARE IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 70, at 8-14 (discussing findings that states do not 
ensure adequate access to physicians); see also Robert Pear, For Medicaid Enrollees, Access to Care 
Is Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2014, at A26 (discussing the OIG report). 
77. See, e.g., Sandra L. Decker, Two-Thirds of Primary Care Physicians Accepted New 
Medicaid Patients in 2011−12: A Baseline To Measure Future Acceptance Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF., 
1183, 1184-86 (2013) (discussing various physicians’ willingness to accept new Medicaid patients). 
78. See, e.g., Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next Challenge—Securing Primary Care for 
Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 493 (2011). 
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would not ordinarily have participated.79 But, without congressional action or 
voluntary state continuation, this reimbursement increase will diminish in 2015 
and may leave new enrollees with renewed inequities.80 It is possible that Medicaid 
enrollees purchasing insurance from qualified health plans through premium 
assistance in the exchanges in waiver states may face less discrimination accessing 
care, in which case those demonstration waivers will have served a more important 
purpose than the political negotiation and strategizing discussed above. But it is 
too soon to know if the cloak of private insurance coverage is enough to facilitate 
equal access for Medicaid beneficiaries. 
An additional source of inequity is Medicaid providers’ and enrollees’ tenuous 
ability to enforce the Medicaid Act against noncompliant states in federal court. 
The Supreme Court will hear again the question of whether private parties can 
enforce the Medicaid Act by Supremacy Clause actions this term, and the prospects 
are dim for continued viability of private actions.81 Just two terms ago, the Court 
barely upheld such private actions in Douglas v. Independent Living Center by 
allowing HHS to exercise primary jurisdiction and bypassing the Supremacy 
Clause question in deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statutory question 
of adequate reimbursement in that case.82 Losing the ability to enforce the terms of 
the Medicaid Act through private rights of action would decrease HHS oversight, 
as the agency has stated publically that it relies on private actions to alert it to state 
mistreatment of the Medicaid program and its providers and beneficiaries. Without 
on the ground, de facto private enforcers, HHS would have a much harder job 
ensuring that the newly universal program achieves equitable care for its new and 
old populations. In recognition of this potential regulatory failure, Congress 
incorporated new reporting requirements through the ACA into the Medicaid Act 
that require states to report on equal access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries.83 
But, HHS has not clearly indicated how it will use state reports to increase equal 
access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries.  
The universality principle should ensure adequate and equal access to care, 
79. Adam S. Wilk, Differential Responses Among Primary Care Physicians to Varying 
Medicaid Fees, 50 INQUIRY 296 (2013) (studying evidence of physician uptake due to the increase in 
payments). 
80. The ACA Primary Care Increase: State Plans for SFY 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 28, 
2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/perspective/the-aca-primary-care-increase-state-plans-for-sfy-2015. 
81. Exceptional Child Ctr. v. Armstrong, 567 Fed. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3077 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-15).  
82. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Where There Is a Right, There Must Be 
a Remedy (Even in Medicaid), 102 KY. L. J. 327 (2014); Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid 
Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513 
(2012). 
83. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 26,342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447). 
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but if states refrain from expanding their Medicaid programs for very long, then a 
different aspect of equity is also jeopardized. States could sustain the exclusionary 
practices in health care that the ACA is meant to end, thereby decreasing equity in 
health care access. Though all states will eventually expand (it took many years 
for all states to participate in the first iteration of Medicaid fifty years ago), until 
they do, health care equity will not be achieved. In addition to harming the health 
of low-income residents who would qualify for Medicaid in opt in states, state 
reticence to expand could affect private insurance plans. Enrollees often move in 
and out of Medicaid due to fluctuations in income, a phenomenon known as churn. 
Without Medicaid expansion, the newly eligible population in opt out states will 
be sicker when it moves into private insurance through exchanges or employers, 
raising costs for all.  
D. Universality in Eligibility 
Medicaid contains eight statutory categories of eligibility now, with the eighth 
being childless adults under the age of sixty-five earning up to 133% of the federal 
poverty level—the newly eligible population.84 Medicaid eligibility should be 
integrated in light of universality. The categories of eligibility, which were proxies 
for policy determinations as to who was considered “deserving” of medical 
assistance, are no longer germane. Condensing eligibility into one level, uniform 
category would reinforce the philosophy of universality and would complement 
the other dimensions of governance, administration, and equity. 
Under current law, state Medicaid agencies determine whether an applicant 
meets the particular standards for financial eligibility in a given state in light of 
their categorical status, a status that is now antiquated and unnecessarily 
complicated. Eligibility should be a straightforward financial criterion, with no 
discrimination among the poor depending on whether they are pregnant, disabled, 
elderly, childless, or something else.  
Single category eligibility would require reconsideration of technical 
differences between existing categories. For example, the Medicaid Act requires 
very specific medical care for children, which should be retained in recognition of 
their unique vulnerability.85 Another example is the optional coverage of pregnant 
women earning more than 133% of the FPL that most states provide (median 
coverage level was approximately 200% of the FPL as of June 2014).86 Eligibility 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). The ACA also expanded coverage of poor 
children aged 5 to 18 up to 133% of the FPL from 100% of the FPL, but children were already 
covered, so this is not new eligibility, just expanded eligibility. See id. 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2012). 
86. Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Levels for Children and Non-
Disabled Adults as of April 1, 2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), 
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unification should not occur at the expense of patients who have benefitted from 
state largess through optional Medicaid coverage. But, if the ACA’s private 
insurance reforms succeed over time, then states will not need to cover certain 
populations above 133% of the FPL, because they will become privately insured 
through employers or be able to purchase individual or small group insurance on 
the health insurance exchanges.  
Unified eligibility would be a logical conclusion to many aspects of the 
ACA’s and Medicaid’s new universality. For example, the “no wrong door” 
enrollment facilitated by the ACA, which allows uninsured people to enter into the 
health insurance system by submitting one application that will direct them to the 
type of insurance coverage that they may acquire given financial circumstance, 
would be greatly simplified and enhanced by a single category of eligibility for 
Medicaid.87 Unified eligibility would be consistent with the new universality and 
inclusion embodied by the law of Medicaid. 
*** 
In sum, universality suffuses multiple dimensions of Medicaid, diminishing 
the program’s fragmentation while also revealing a fragility in the ACA’s 
expansion. HHS is engaged in a highly pragmatic set of negotiations with states 
that invites expansion in order to cover lives and entrench the new federal policy 
of inclusion. Contrariwise, the agency must develop its underused ability to do 
more than implore—it can and should enforce the ACA’s statutory principle of 
universality and rejection of exclusion. HHS can strengthen Medicaid as it expands 
and settles into expansion over the coming years. But, if HHS does not, then 
fragmentation in Medicaid will continue, not only to the detriment of enrollees, 
but also to the detriment of the program’s finances.88 Though universality could 
appear costly in terms of increasing enrollment, it is also very likely to produce 
economic benefits through such effects as streamlining, long term benefits related 
to preventive care, and unified policy clarification.89 Not only is universality the 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/7993-05-where-are-states-today-fact-
sheet-june-2014.pdf.  
87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2201, 124 Stat. 119, 
289-91 (2010). 
88. States have long struggled to finance Medicaid, especially during economic recessions. See, 
e.g., Moon, supra note 69, at 329. 
89. See Sherry Glied & Stephanie Ma, How States Stand to Gain or Lose Federal Funds by 
Opting In or Out of the Medicaid Expansion, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (2013), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/Dec/1718_Gli
ed_how_states_stand_gain_lose_Medicaid_expansion_ib_v2.pdf (quantifying and explaining why 
Medicaid expansion is an economic net gain for most if not all states); Robin Rudowitz et al., Issue 
Brief: Implementing the ACA: Medicaid Spending & Enrollment Growth for FY 2014 and FY 2015, 
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new law of Medicaid, but regardless of theoretical design, it is economically 
sensible too. 
CONCLUSION 
The elderly and the poor were once in the same bucket; undesirable as 
patients, often expensive or complex to treat, and often unable to afford their own 
care. The elderly were elevated to Medicare’s social insurance, a program unique 
in America’s historically limited redistributive policy, through effective lobbying 
that federalized and standardized their benefits. While the principle of inclusion 
was codified for the elderly in Medicare in 1965, it took almost another fifty years 
to codify the precept that non-elderly people also merit non-exclusionary 
coverage.90 Medicaid’s de facto social insurance is not as stable as Medicare’s, 
though, because Medicare beneficiaries do not age out of their coverage and form 
a politically cohesive group. From an enrollment standpoint, the Medicaid 
population is less consistent than Medicare’s. Further, Medicaid is a different kind 
of insurance because of the variation that state participation introduces into the 
program.  
This essay has explored the shift from fragmentation and exclusion to 
universality and inclusion across four different spheres. While this shift is a 
positive normative development in health care, an obvious downside to Medicaid’s 
new universality is that a person must be very low income to benefit from it. 
Another disadvantage of building universality on Medicaid is that it has not been 
a particularly stable program, often instead approximating a political hot potato. 
Nevertheless, expanding Medicaid has long been on the health reform radar, and 
the ACA took considerable steps toward both nationalizing and universalizing 
Medicaid. Medicaid’s new universality will be felt not only by the sheer number 
of people in the program as it grows over the next several years, but also in the 
possible defragmenting effects it will have in the health care system as a whole. 
HHS must recognize its key role in effectuating universality, which is now the 
law of Medicaid. Centralized guidance with universality as its focal point will help 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/implementing-the-aca-medicaid-
spending-issue-brief (Medicaid spending increases in opt out states in 2014-15 will be greater than 
in expansion states due to lack of federal funding); Reid Wilson, Study: Refusing Medicaid Expansion 
Will Cost States Billions of Dollars, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/12/06/study-refusing-medicaid-
expansion-will-cost-states-billions-of-dollars (explaining that states spend more on attempting to 
draw new businesses to the state than they will spend on Medicaid expansion). 
90. The original Medicaid Act contained a provision that admonished states to expand Medicaid 
to everyone who qualified financially by 1975, but the provision was postponed and then repealed. 
SMITH & MOORE, supra note 22, at 50. 
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this newly inclusive form of medical assistance accomplish the principal 
philosophical underpinning of the ACA, which initiates a shared responsibility for 
health care, if not fully recognizing health care as a public good. Medicaid’s 
transition to universality is a story still in the writing—one that will potentially 
shape health care for more than a quarter of Americans for years to come. 
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